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INTRODUCTION
A trespass is an unauthorized entry upon the land of another. In
general, this is a fairly simple legal concept. Indeed, most non-lawyers
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have a pretty good idea of what “trespass” means. But various
complications can arise in the context of oil and gas or mining activities.
Some of these complications arise from the property laws that govern
the right to engage in mineral production. First, for example, multiple
courts have concluded that an owner’s right to exclude others from her
property—one of the sticks of ownership that lies at the heart of trespass
claims—becomes attenuated at locations deep below the surface, just as
this right becomes attenuated at substantial elevations above the earth.1
Second, the property laws of most states allow landowners to sever mineral
rights from surface ownership. In such circumstances, both the surface
estate owner and the mineral estate owner may have certain rights of use
and possession in the same tract of land. They each may have some ability
to assert trespass claims against the other, but the figurative boundaries
between their respective rights in the tracts where they share ownership
are not always as clear-cut as the literal boundaries between two
neighboring, separate tracts of land.
Other complications relate to public policy, the nature of mineral
activities, or both. For instance, a third complication is that public policy
favors mineral development, but the nature of some exploration and
production activities is such that it is difficult or impossible to ensure that
the activity stops at a defined line in space. Fourth, when a “good faith”
trespasser removes minerals from a tract, there are competing policy
arguments regarding the proper measure of damages for the removal of
minerals.
Notably, more than one of these “complications” can be present at the
same time. If this is the case, a court may be willing to reconsider the
normally “settled” rules of property law. For example, suppose that a
person’s activity causes an intrusion into a neighbor’s property. Such an
intrusion normally would support a trespass action, even in the absence of
harm. But suppose that the activity that caused the intrusion is favored by
public policy, that the intrusion causes no actual harm, and that it occurs
in the subsurface at a depth that the typical landowner never uses. A court
might conclude that the landowner’s interest in excluding others from such
depths of the subsurface is so attenuated that the intrusion will not support
a trespass action in the absence of harm.
Sometimes in these contexts, trespass claims raise legal issues for
which no well settled law exists. The lack of settled law may be partly due
to the competing interests involved, such as the complexity of balancing
the respective interests of the surface estate owner and the mineral estate
owner when a split estate exists. Also, it may be partly due to the relatively
1. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264–65 (1946).
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new nature of some of these disputes. The common law is several hundred
years old, but the oil and gas industry is only about 160 years old. The
concept of “pooling” is less than a hundred years old, and the practice of
hydraulic fracturing is only about seventy years old.
In any event, the law surrounding trespass disputes regrading oil and
gas mining activities continues to develop and evolve. This Article
examines the continuing evolution of the law of trespass, focusing on
recent disputes arising from five factual scenarios involving oil and gas or
mining activities. Namely, after a brief review of trespass law, this Article
considers recent developments relating to: (1) trespass claims by
landowners who allege that natural gas from a nearby natural gas storage
operation has migrated into the subsurface of their land; (2) trespass claims
by landowners who assert that a hydraulic fracturing operation on
neighboring land has caused a subsurface trespass; (3) trespass claims by
a mineral estate owner’s lessee’s claim that a landowner had no authority
to authorize a company to drill through a subsurface formation that
allegedly contains oil in order to reach a target location beneath
neighboring land; (4) trespass claims by a landowner’s claim that a mineral
estate owner and its lessee have no right to enter a pooling agreement that
authorizes use of the land’s subsurface for a horizontal lateral that captures
natural gas from perforations located beneath other tracts, even if the
landowner’s tract is part of the pooled drilling unit; and (5) the proper
measure of damages when a good faith trespasser extracts minerals from
beneath a landowner’s tract.
I. THE LAW OF TRESPASS
Before considering recent developments, it may be helpful to review,
first, the basic definition of trespass and, second, the application of
trespass law in the airspace above and area below the surface of the earth.

342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd 154

5/21/20 8:22 AM

2020]

TRESPASS LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

509

A. Definition of Trespass
“Trespass is an unauthorized entry upon the property of another.”2
Courts often describe it as an intrusion onto land in violation of a plaintiff’s
exclusive right of possession.3
A plaintiff must have the right of possession in order to bring a claim
of trespass.4 Typically, a landowner has the right to possess his own land
and, therefore, he will have the right to bring a trespass action if someone
intrudes without permission.5 If the owner does not possess the land, but
no one else has established possession, the landowner has constructive
possession and, therefore, can bring an action in trespass against an
intruder.6

2. Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ohio 1996) (citing
Keesecker v. G.M. McKelvey Co., 47 N.E.2d 211, 214 (Ohio 1943)). The Texas
Supreme Court has stated, “Trespass to real property is an unauthorized entry
upon the land of another, and may occur when one enters—or causes something
to enter—another’s property.” Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore,
LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 46 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Barnes v. Mathis, 353 S.W.3d 760,
764 (Tex. 2011)).
3. See, e.g., Team Enters., LLC v. W. Inv. Real Estate Tr., 647 F.3d 901,
912 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796,
799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (under California law, a trespass is “an invasion of the
interest in the exclusive possession of land.”); see, e.g., Minch Family LLLP v.
Buffalo-Red River Watershed Dist., 628 F.3d 960, 968 (8th Cir. 2010) (Minnesota
law); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 13, at 77 (5th ed. 1984).
4. Florig v. Estate of O’Hara, 912 A.2d 318, 327 n.13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006);
see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 3.
5. Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill SC, LLC, 747 S.E.2d 468, 472–73 (S.C. 2013);
Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693, 700–01
(Minn. 2012). If the land is under lease, the lessee might be the person who has
the right to bring a trespass action. Bascom v. Dempsey, 9 N.E. 744, 744–45
(Mass. 1887) (lessor who was not in possession could not bring trespass action);
Ikomoni v. Exec. Asset Mgmt., LLC, 709 S.E.2d 282, 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011);
Sumrall v. City of E. St. Louis, No. 11-CV-796-WDS, 2013 WL 141694, at *2
(S.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2013) (lessee can bring trespass action). If someone has
established wrongful possession, the landowner may not have a claim in trespass,
but if his ownership has not been lost by adverse possession he may have the right
to bring an ejectment action or a petitory action to force the possessor to leave.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 3; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3651 (2019).
6. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3.
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B. Trespass Can be on Surface or in Airspace or Subsurface
The concept of “trespass” is not limited to unauthorized intrusions
onto the surface of land. The law recognizes that an intrusion into the
airspace above land or the subsurface below it can constitute a trespass.7
This recognition is appropriate for several reasons. First, for surface
possession and ownership to have any utility, a landowner typically must
have ownership rights and control with respect to some distance above and
below the surface of the land. For example, if a landowner is going to build
any structure on his land, the structure will likely project into the airspace
above the ground. Further, a foundation may need to project into the
subsurface, and it is often useful or necessary to have utility lines,
basements, and water wells constructed into the subsurface.
Moreover, classifying an unauthorized intrusion into the airspace
above the surface or the subsurface below the land as trespass is consistent
with the ad coelum doctrine. This doctrine, which has been professed by
prominent common law commentators and numerous American courts,
provides that the owner of land owns not just the surface, but rather the
entire airspace above it and the entire subsurface below it.8 This doctrine’s
name comes from the Latin phrase “cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos,” which has been translated as “for whoever owns the
soil, it is theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell.”9
On numerous occasions, courts have held that liability for trespass can
be based on airspace or subsurface intrusions. For example, courts have
held that a landowner has an action in trespass when some portion of a
neighboring building or other construction intrudes into his airspace. Such
intrusions have included eaves,10 cornices,11 and roofs12 that project over
a plaintiff’s property. Courts have also held that wires passing over a
plaintiff’s property can constitute a trespass,13 and one court held that a
defendant committed a trespass when she extended her arm over the
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1965);
Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93 (Iowa 1902) (airspace); Hastings Oil Co. v.
Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950) (subsurface).
8. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934).
9. Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Tr. v. El Paso E & P Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d
640, 645 (W.D. La. 2011).
10. Huber v. Stark, 102 N.W. 12 (Wis. 1905); cf. Aiken v. Benedict, 39 Barb.
400 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1863) (ejectment action).
11. Harrington v. McCarthy, 48 N.E. 278 (Mass. 1897).
12. Murphy v. Bolger, 15 A. 365 (Vt. 1888).
13. Marcus Cable Assoc., L.P. v. Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. 2002); Butler
v. Frontier Tel. Co., 79 N.E. 716 (N.Y. 1906).
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property line.14 Courts also have recognized that a person commits a
trespass when he drills a well that bottoms below the land of another.15
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF TRESPASS LAW IN
THE CONTEXT OF OIL, GAS, AND MINING ACTIVITY
In recent years, oil and gas activities, along with mining activities,
have given rise to several interesting developments in the law of trespass.
Five of these developments are discussed below, starting with an
allegation of subsurface trespass by storage gas.
A. Natural Gas Storage and Landowners’ Attenuated Interest in
Exclusive Possession of the Subsurface
Several of the recent developments regarding trespass law have
involved claims of subsurface trespass. A recent case from Ohio involved
allegations of subsurface trespass by storage gas. The subsections below
provide background information on natural gas storage and discuss the
recent Ohio case.
1. Background
For some readers, a review of how and why natural gas is stored, and
some of the basic laws governing such storage, will be helpful.
a. Natural Gas Storage
After natural gas has been produced, it is often stored in the
subsurface—typically either in (1) the pore spaces of depleted oil and gas
reservoirs; (2) salt dome caverns that have been created by solution
mining; or (3) the pore spaces of aquifers. Nearly 400 active storage sites
exist in the continental United States, with a little over half of the states
having at least one underground storage facility.16 During summer months,
14. Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93 (Iowa 1902).
15. Williams v. Continental Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 58 (W.D. Okla. 1953);
Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950); Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil
Co., 16 So. 2d 471 (La. 1944); Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate,
76 P.2d 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938).
16. The U.S. Energy Information Administration publishes data on natural
gas storage capacity (as well as the amount of gas in storage). The published data
includes capacity in each state. A state-by-state review of the materials shows that
most states have some subsurface storage capacity for natural gas. Underground
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when demand for natural gas is lower,17 a portion of the gas being
produced within the United States is injected into subsurface storage
systems.18 During winter, when natural gas is in demand for heating
buildings, natural gas is withdrawn from storage.19
Generally, companies planning to develop a subsurface storage
operation will seek to inject gas in a location where impermeable
subsurface features will limit how far the gas spreads. These companies
typically attempt to acquire subsurface rights for the entire space that they
anticipate the injected gas will occupy. They can do this through the
private purchase of land or subsurface storage rights, but they can also use
eminent domain.
b. The Use of Eminent Domain to Acquire Subsurface Storage Rights
Under the Natural Gas Act,20 a company generally must acquire “a
certificate of public convenience and necessity” before beginning
construction of interstate natural gas facilities. If a company holding such
a certificate “cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the
owner of property to the compensation to be paid for” the property rights
necessary for the company “to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line
or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas,” or the additional “land
or other property” needed “for the location of compressor stations,
pressure apparatus, or other stations or equipment necessary to the proper
operation of such pipe line or pipe lines,” the company may acquire those
rights through the use of eminent domain.21 Although the portion of the
Natural Gas Act that grants eminent domain authority does not expressly
refer to storage facilities, courts have concluded that the eminent domain
authority granted by the Act includes the authority to condemn subsurface
Natural Gas Capacity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/
dnav/ng/ng_stor_cap_dcu_NUS_a.htm [https://perma.cc/5TUN-486F] (last visited
Mar. 1, 2020).
17. Winter heating needs lead to larger consumption during winter. The use
of electricity to run air conditioning units during the summer can lead to an
increase in consumption of natural gas to fuel gas-fired power plants, particularly
during the hottest summer months, but the height-of-summer peak is much
smaller than the winter peak.
18. See, e.g., Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 929 F.3d 767, 770
(6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-502, 2020 WL 129585 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2020).
19. Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717w (2018).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018); see, e.g., In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938
F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2019).
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rights needed for the operation of a storage facility22 based on the theory
that storage facilities are “necessary” for the transport of gas.23
c. Potential Disputes Relating to Natural Gas Storage
Various disputes can arise from subsurface storage projects. For
example, during eminent domain proceedings, disputes may arise
regarding the amount of compensation to be paid24 or which person is
entitled to the compensation if the land involved has a split estate.25
A natural gas company may also contend that some of its storage gas
has migrated beyond the area where the company has acquired storage
rights, and that a neighbor’s gas well is producing escaped storage gas,
rather than native gas. This could occur if some geologic feature that the
company thought would prevent the migration of gas beyond a certain
point fails to do so. In such cases, the neighbor may dispute the contention
that its wells are producing storage gas. Further, the neighbor may argue
that, if its wells are producing escaped storage gas, the rule of capture
applies to such gas.26
Even if a storage operator’s neighbor does not have any gas wells,
disputes can still arise if the storage company fails to initially acquire
subsurface storage rights for the entire space its injected gas occupies. In
such cases, the neighboring landowners might allege that the migration of
gas into the subsurface of their land constitutes a trespass. The next section
of this Article discusses such a case.

22. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 369 F.
Supp. 156, 159 (D. Iowa 1974); N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approximately 9117.53 Acres,
781 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D. Kan. 2011); B&J Oil & Gas v. FERC, 353 F.3d 71
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage
Easement, 578 F. Supp. 930, 932 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
23. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 369 F. Supp. at 159. As an alternative to
using the Natural Gas Act, companies sometimes may be able to rely on state law
as a source of eminent domain authority. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 19:2 (2019).
24. S. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sutton, 406 So. 2d 669 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981); S.
Nat. Gas Co. v. Poland, 406 So. 2d 657 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.1981); Miss. River
Transmission Corp. v. Tabor, 757 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1985).
25. Cf. United States v. 43.42 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 1042 (W.D. La.
1982) (involving a mineral servitude, rather than a mineral estate).
26. See, e.g., Anderson v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d 1023 (Kan. 1985).
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2. Recent Development—Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission
In Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC,27 plaintiffs filed suit,
asserting that storage gas from the defendant’s facility had migrated into
the subsurface of their land and that this intrusion constituted a trespass.
Indeed, the plaintiffs alleged that a storage operator had been using the
subsurface of their land for years for storing gas. The defendant filed for
summary judgment. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs, it appeared that Columbia Gas and its predecessor-in-interest
had operated the Medina Storage Field at a depth of approximately 3,000
feet near Medina, Ohio since 1958. Nevertheless, the companies did not
seek to obtain any subsurface easements until 2013, at which time
Columbia Gas wrote letters to nearby landowners, offering to purchase
subsurface easements from them. The landowners rejected these offers and
filed suit, alleging trespass and unjust enrichment. The plaintiffs sought
damages for the value of storage space for those years.
Columbia filed a condemnation claim and acquired a subsurface
easement from the plaintiffs in return for compensation equal to the value
of the easement. Columbia also filed a motion for summary judgment,
seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for compensation for the
company’s past use of their subsurface. Relying on Chance v. BP
Chemicals, Inc.,28 (alleged subsurface trespass by fluid from injection
disposal operation), the district court held that the plaintiffs did not have a
cause of action for trespass.
On the other hand, the district court entered summary judgment
holding that Columbia was liable for unjust enrichment for having used
the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ land for storage without compensating
them earlier. As full compensation on the unjust enrichment claim, the
court order awarded an amount equal to the interest on the amount that
Columbia had paid for the subsurface easements it acquired via eminent
domain with interest running from March 5, 2008, until the time
compensation was paid. The court chose March 5, 2008, as the starting
date for interest because the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ unjust
enrichment claim was time-barred as to earlier periods.
The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their trespass claim, as well as
the court’s holding that the pre-judgment interest on the condemnation
payment amounted to full compensation for their unjust enrichment claim.
Columbia, of course, argued on appeal that the dismissal of the plaintiffs’
trespass claim was correct. Columbia did not cross-appeal the district
27. 929 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2019).
28. 670 N.E.2d 985, 986 (Ohio 1996).
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court’s judgment holding the company liable for unjust enrichment, but
the company defended the damages award (against the plaintiffs’
contention that the award was too low) by arguing that the district court
actually should have held that the company was not liable for unjust
enrichment.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in
Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc. In Chance, the plaintiffs brought a class
action, alleging that fluids from the defendant’s injection disposal wells
had intruded into the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ properties.29 The
plaintiffs asserted that this alleged intrusion constituted a trespass, and
they sought injunctive relief and monetary damages.30 After a jury
returned a verdict finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove any damages
or unreasonable interference with foreseeable uses of their properties, the
trial court entered judgment for the defendant.31 The appellate court
affirmed, and the Ohio Supreme Court agreed to review the case. The
plaintiffs argued that proof of a subsurface intrusion is sufficient to
establish a trespass claim, and that they need not prove damages.32 The
Ohio Supreme Court disagreed. It referred to cases that had rejected
arguments that, based on the ad coelum doctrine, a landowner could assert
a trespass claim whenever an airplane flies over her land. The court
29. Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 986–87 (Ohio 1996). The
defendant used the injection wells to dispose of hazardous waste byproducts from
the manufacture of industrial chemicals. Id. at 986. Underground injection wells
are a common way of disposing of waste fluids, with many thousands of these
wells having been granted permits to operate in the United States. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency’s website contains spreadsheets which
show the injection well “inventory.” The 2018 inventory for injection well
permits, excluding wells permitted to operate on tribal lands, shows that
approximately 781 Class I wells, 177,763 Class II wells, 26,714 Class III wells,
103 Class IV wells, 528,300 Class V wells, and 2 Class VI wells have permits.
UIC Injection Well Inventory, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa
.gov/uic/uic-injection-well-inventory [https://perma.cc/ZF4E-DC5Z] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2020). The 2018 inventory of injection wells that have received a permit
to operate on tribal lands includes about 6528 additional wells of various types.
Id. These wells are regulated under the federal Safe Drinking Water Act. A
description of the underground injection control provisions of this Act can be
found in various articles. See, e.g., Bruce M. Kramer, Federal Legislative and
Administrative Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, 44 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 837 (2012); Keith B. Hall, Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing under the
Safe Drinking Water Act, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2011).
30. Chance, 670 N.E.2d at 986.
31. Id. at 989.
32. Id. at 993.
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declared that a literal application of the ad coelum doctrine “has no place
in the modern world.”33 The court stated:
[W]e do not accept appellants’ assertion of absolute ownership of
everything below the surface of their properties. Just as a property
owner must accept some limitations on the ownership rights
extending above the surface of the property, we find that there are
also limitations on property owners’ subsurface rights.34
The court then quoted, with approval, a case in which the Ninth Circuit
stated that a person’s ownership of the airspace above his land extends
only so far as the space he can use and occupy.35 The Ohio Supreme Court
concluded that similar reasoning should be extended to subsurface rights.36
Therefore, in order for litigants to recover in trespass for the sort of
subsurface intrusion alleged by the plaintiffs, they must prove “physical
damage or actual interference with the reasonable and foreseeable use of
the properties.”37 Because the plaintiffs had not proven damages or
interference with use, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
against them.38 Notably, this rule differs from the rule that generally
applies to surface trespasses, which usually does not require a showing of
actual damages or interference with use. Thus, the landowner’s right to
exclusive possession—that is, her right to exclude others—is not the same
deep beneath the surface of the land.
The Sixth Circuit then turned back to the natural gas storage dispute
in front of it. The court concluded, based on Chance, that the plaintiffs
could not prevail on their trespass claim against the natural gas storage
operators unless the plaintiffs could prove actual damages or an
interference with a foreseeable use of their property.39 Because the
plaintiffs could not do that, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the defendants.40
The court rejected various attempts by the plaintiffs to distinguish
Chance. For example, the plaintiffs argued that Chance only applied to
claims for indirect trespass, but that they were presenting a claim for a
direct trespass. In fact, Chance qualified its holding by noting that the
33. Id. at 991.
34. Id. at 992.
35. Id. at 991–92.
36. Id. at 992.
37. Id. at 993.
38. Id. at 994.
39. Baatz v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 929 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.
2019), cert. denied, No. 19-502, 2020 WL 129585 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2020).
40. Id. at 773.
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plaintiffs in that case were bringing a claim for indirect trespass. The Sixth
Circuit concluded, however, that the reasoning in Chance regarding the
landowner’s lack of a possessory interest in the deep subsurface applied
equally, whether the trespass at issue was a direct or indirect one.41
Finally, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ claims for unjust
enrichment. Under Ohio law, one of the elements of an unjust enrichment
claim is the conferral of some benefit on the defendant by the plaintiff.42
The court concluded that because the plaintiffs lacked a possessory interest
in the deep subsurface, the plaintiffs had not conferred a benefit on the
defendants.43 Therefore, the landowners were not entitled to recovery.
The main significance of Baatz does not relate to disputes in which a
landowner sues the operator of a subsurface natural gas storage facility,
alleging subsurface trespass, as relatively few of these disputes arise.
Rather, the main significance of Baatz is that it applied, in a new factual
setting, the Chance rationale that a landowner generally does not have a
right to exclude others from locations deep below her property. On the
contrary, under Ohio law, in order to have a claim for trespass or a
subsurface intrusion that occurs deep beneath the surface, a landowner
must show either actual harm or that the intrusion interferes with a
41. Id. at 772. Further, it is not clear that the plaintiffs in Baatz were correct
in asserting that they were bringing a claim based on a direct trespass. The Sixth
Circuit noted that a direct trespass occurs when a defendant takes an action that
results in an immediate invasion of the plaintiff’s property. Id. at 772–73 n.2. An
indirect trespass occurs when a defendant discharges an object that, after being
released on property not owned by the plaintiff, migrates to the plaintiff’s
property. Id. One could argue that the injection of natural gas at a site not on a
plaintiff’s property, which results in a migration of gas into the subsurface of a
plaintiff’s property, is an indirect trespass. Bizarrely, the plaintiffs also apparently
attempted to distinguish Chance based on the fact that Chance had rejected
application of the negative rule of capture, a doctrine based on certain legal
principles relating to oil and gas extraction, because the Chance was not an oil
and gas extraction case. But Baatz likewise was not an oil and gas extraction case,
so the plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Chance on that basis was erroneous.
Further, if there had been a sound basis to distinguish Chance, and the negative
rule of capture had therefore applied, it would have defeated the plaintiffs’ claim,
not sustained it. Moreover, as noted by the Sixth Circuit, Chance’s rejection of
the negative rule of capture, based on the fact that Chance was not an oil and gas
extraction case, did not necessarily mean that Chance’s conclusion, that a
landowner lacks a possessory interest in depths far below the surface, would be
inapplicable in a case that happened to involve oil and gas extraction, which of
course Baatz did not. Id. at 773.
42. Id. at 776.
43. Id. at 777.
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reasonably foreseeable use of her property. This suggests that courts will
not limit Chance to instances involving waste fluid injections for which a
company has obtained a Safe Drinking Water Act permit.
B. The Subsurface Travel of Hydraulic Fracturing Fluids Across
Property Lines
The question of whether a company commits a subsurface trespass if
its hydraulic fracturing operations cause frac fluid and proppants to intrude
into the subsurface of a neighboring tract has attracted considerable
attention.44 As discussed later in this section of this Article, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently decided a much-awaited case on
this issue.45
1. Background
To appreciate the significance of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
recent decision regarding subsurface trespass claims, it is helpful for
readers to be familiar with the basics of hydraulic fracturing and prior
court decisions involving claims that hydraulic fracturing operations
caused a subsurface trespass.
a. Hydraulic Fracturing
Most deposits of oil and gas are not located in subsurface caverns or
in large, underground void spaces.46 Instead, they are located in the small

44. Several oil and gas scholars and practitioners have written on this subject.
See, e.g., Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines,
is there an Actionable Trespass, 54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 361 (2014); David E. Pierce,
Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern
Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 259–64 (2011); Owen L.
Anderson, Lord Coke, the Restatement, and Modern Subsurface Trespass Law, 6
TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 203 (2010–2011); Norman J. Hyne & Laura H.
Burney, Hydraulic Fracturing: Stimulating Your Well or Trespassing Theirs?, 44
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19-1 (1998); Terry D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing:
The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass, 28 TULSA L.J. 311 (1993).
45. See Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 2020 WL 355911 (Pa. 2020).
46. RICHARD C. SELLEY, ELEMENTS OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGY 239 (2d ed.
1997); JAMES G. SPEIGHT, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF PETROLEUM
103 (3d ed. 1999). Indeed, the word “petroleum” is Latin for “rock oil.” See
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 809, 869 (10th ed. 1993)
(defining “oleum,” “petr,” and “petroleum”); DONALD J. BORROR, DICTIONARY
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pore spaces of certain subterranean rock formations.47 In oil and gas
operations that do not involve hydraulic fracturing, an oil or gas well is
drilled into such a formation, and the oil or gas must then travel through
the “solid” rock to reach the well.48 In some formations, the oil or gas can
easily do that by moving from one pore space to the next, through
interconnections between the pores, or sometimes by flowing through
natural fractures in the rock.49
But in some formations that contain oil or gas there is relatively little
natural fracturing, and the interconnections between pore spaces are
narrow and too few in number for oil or gas to flow through the rock at a
significant rate.50 Such formations are sometimes described as being
“tight”51 or as having low permeability (a solid object’s “permeability” is
OF WORD ROOTS AND COMBINING FORMS 66, 73 (1960) (describing both Latin
and Greek origins).
47. See sources cited supra note 46.
48. SPEIGHT, supra note 46, at 164–65; MARTIN S. RAYMOND & WILLIAM L.
LEFFLER, OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION IN NONTECHNICAL LANGUAGE 167 (2006).
49. RAYMOND & LEFFLER, supra note 48, at 39. See also Thomas E. Kurth et
al., American Law and Jurisprudence on Fracking, 58 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
4-1, 4-6 (2012) (discussing the Austin Chalk as an example of a low permeability
formation that has extensive natural fracturing). Typically, oil and gas in the
subsurface exist in a fluid state—either as a liquid or a gas—though sometimes
oil can exist as a solid or as a liquid that is so viscous that it appears to be in the
solid state. 1 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
OIL & GAS LAW § 101 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2019). Because they are
fluids, oil or gas will flow of their own accord from a location at higher pressure
to a location at lower pressure. Id. at § 104; Deltic Timber Corp. v. Great Lakes
Chem. Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1197 (W.D. Ark. 1998); Nw. Cent. Pipeline
Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 497 (1989). Further, underground
formations are often under a much higher pressure than exists on the surface.
Thus, if a well is drilled to a formation that contains oil or gas, the natural pressure
of the formation often will cause those fluids to flow to the well and up to the
surface. 1 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL
& GAS LAW § 101 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2019). Other times, oil can be
pumped to the surface.
50. See NORMAN J. HYNE, NONTECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY,
EXPLORATION, DRILLING, AND PRODUCTION 158 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining that
the interconnections between pores sometimes are called “pore throats”).
51. See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND
GAS TERMS 1110 (10th ed. 1997) (defining “tight sands”); see also GROUND
WATER PROT. COUNCIL & ALL CONSULTING, MODERN SHALE GAS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 15 (2009), http://www.gwpc.org/sites/default/
files/ShaleGasPrimer2̈009.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MMQ-VBAV] [hereinafter
SHALE GAS PRIMER] (referring to “tight gas”).
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a measure of the ease with which a fluid moves through the solid).52 If the
formation’s permeability is too low, oil and gas will not move through the
formation quickly enough to justify the expense of drilling a well.53
Essentially, the oil and gas will remain trapped in isolated pore spaces.
If a person could create new cracks or fractures in the rock formation,
any oil and gas in the formation could use those fractures as supplemental
pathways to the wellbore.54 This would result in higher rates of oil and gas
production, and the higher rates of production could make drilling
economical, despite the formation’s low permeability.55 The process of
creating such fractures is called “fracturing.”
Operators began engaging in fracturing in the 1860s.56 They would
lower an explosive into the well and detonate it, thereby fracturing the
formation.57 Such “explosive fracturing,” sometimes called “shooting a
well,” was used until at least the mid-1900s.58 But in the late 1940s,
hydraulic fracturing was developed.59 In hydraulic fracturing, companies
use hydraulic pressure to open new fractures and increase the size of
existing fractures, thereby opening pathways for oil or gas to flow to the
well.60 Today, hydraulic fracturing is a process that is frequently used by
companies engaged in the exploration for and production of oil and natural

52. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 51, at 775 (defining “[p]ermeability
of rock” as “[a] measure of the resistance offered by rock to the movement of fluids
through it”); see also SHALE GAS PRIMER, supra note 51, at 82.
53. See DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING
OF THE MODERN WORLD 328 (2011) [hereinafter YERGIN, THE QUEST].
54. SHALE GAS PRIMER, supra note 51, at 56; David E. Pierce, Carol Rose
Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir
Problems, 19 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 259–60 (2011).
55. See SHALE GAS PRIMER, supra note 51, at ES-4; YERGIN, THE QUEST,
supra note 53, at 328–29.
56. See HYNE, supra note 50, at 422; see also Roberts v. Dickey, 20 F. Cas.
880, 883–84 (W.D. Pa. 1871) (No. 11,899) (discussing a patent granted in 1866
for an invention relating to explosive fracturing); see also People’s Gas Co. v.
Tyner, 31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892) (nuisance action in which plaintiffs complained
about use of explosive fracturing in urban area).
57. HYNE, supra note 50, at 422; see also GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE
FRACKERS: THE OUTRAGEOUS INSIDE STORY OF THE NEW BILLIONAIRE
WILDCATTERS 27–28 (2013).
58. HYNE, supra note 50, at 422.
59. Kurth et al., supra note 49, at 279.
60. HYNE, supra note 50, at 423.
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gas.61 It has contributed to a substantial increase in the production of oil
and gas in the United States.
But the use of hydraulic fracturing can also lead to new legal issues.
For example, because it is difficult to control the length of hydraulic
fractures, occasionally the fractures created by a company’s operations on
and beneath one tract, along with the hydraulic fracturing fluid that created
the fractures, will allegedly cross into the subsurface of a neighboring
tract. In these circumstances, a person who asserts that he or she has rights
in the neighboring tract may bring a claim for trespass.
b. Past Disputes Involving the Travel of Hydraulic Fracturing Fluids
Across Property Lines
In at least a few cases, parties have litigated disputes in which a
plaintiff alleged that the defendant committed a subsurface trespass by
causing fracturing fluids to enter the subsurface of the plaintiff’s property.
Until very recently the leading case arose out of Texas, with another
notable case litigated in West Virginia.
i. Garza—The Texas Supreme Court’s View
In Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had hydraulically fractured wells drilled on land
adjacent to the land where the plaintiffs owned a royalty interest
(“plaintiffs’ land”), and that the fractures created by the defendant’s
operations had intruded into the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ land.62 The
plaintiffs sought damages, alleging that the fractures had facilitated the
drainage of hydrocarbons from beneath their land, and that such drainage
had cost them royalty revenue that would have been due to them if the
hydrocarbons had been produced by a well located on their land, as
opposed to being produced by the defendant’s well on the adjoining
property.63 The plaintiffs did not allege any damages other than the loss of
royalty revenue.64

61. A Congressional Research Service report states that more than 90 percent
of new wells in the United States are hydraulically fractured. MARY TIEMANN &
ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41760, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND
SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT REGULATORY ISSUES (2013).
62. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.
2008).
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 12–13.
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The majority stated that the they need not decide whether the crossborder fracturing was a trespass because it was clear that there was no
“actionable trespass.”65 The court explained that, because the plaintiffs
were mineral estate owners who had granted an oil and gas lease, the
plaintiffs lacked a possessory interest. Because they lacked a possessory
interest, the plaintiffs could not recover in trespass without injury. Further
the rule of capture barred any recovery for drainage, which was the only
injury alleged by the plaintiffs.66 The court described the rule of capture as
applying whenever a person produces oil or gas “from a lawful well
bottomed on . . . property” where the person has a right to operate.67
ii. Stone—The View of a Federal District Court in West Virginia
In Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the plaintiffs asserted
claims for trespass.68 They alleged that the defendant drilled a well that
contained a vertical section about 200 feet from the plaintiffs’ property but
that the well’s horizontal lateral approached to within “tens of feet” of their
property, and that the hydraulic fracturing fluid intruded into the
subsurface of their property.69
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the trespass claim.70
They argued that the claim was barred by the rule of capture,71 relying in
part on the reasoning of Garza,72 but the Stone court rejected that
argument. The federal court concluded that the rule of capture should not
apply when a defendant causes a fluid to intrude into the subsurface of the
plaintiff’s land. It then concluded that there had been a trespass, relying on
the fact that the West Virginia Supreme Court previously had stated the ad
coelum doctrine governed a landowner’s ownership rights.73 It rejected
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 13. Several sources provide a fuller discussion of Garza. See, e.g.,
Hall, supra note 44, 394–97. Although Garza stands as the leading Texas case,
there were some pre-Garza cases. Id. at 392–94.
68. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2013 WL 2097397 *1 (N.D. W.
Va.). The plaintiffs also asserted a claim for a breach of the implied covenant to
protect against drainage (the defendant was the plaintiffs’ lessee) and a breach of
contract, with the alleged breach being that the defendant had pooled the
plaintiffs’ property with other properties for purposes of production from the
Marcellus Shale, but that the plaintiffs’ lease did not authorize such pooling.
69. Id. at *2.
70. Id. at *1.
71. Id. at *2.
72. Id. at *4.
73. Id. at *6 (quoting Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975)).
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arguments that a landowner lacks a possessory interest at depths far
beneath the surface. The federal court’s judgment was later vacated after
the parties reached a settlement.
2. Recent Development—Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production
Co.
In Briggs v. Southwestern Energy Production Company,74 the
plaintiffs owned the surface and mineral rights in an unleased tract of
approximately 11 acres.75 Southwestern Energy held an oil and gas lease
on the neighboring tract.76 Southwestern drilled and conducted hydraulic
fracturing on and beneath that neighboring tract.77
In November 2015, the plaintiffs filed suit against Southwestern,
asserting that Southwestern had extracted natural gas from beneath their
tract and that they had claims for trespass and conversion.78 The plaintiffs
did not expressly allege that Southwestern’s activities had caused an
intrusion into the subsurface of their property by a wellbore or hydraulic
fracturing fluid.79
Southwestern filed an answer and sought a declaratory judgment that
the company had no liability to the plaintiffs.80 Southwestern stated that
the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the rule of capture.81 Southwestern
also asserted that the plaintiffs failed to plead the elements necessary to
establish a trespass, but Southwestern did not file a preliminary objection
in the nature of a demurrer or a motion for failure to state a claim.82 In
responding to Southwestern’s assertions, the plaintiffs alleged that
Southwestern acted with the intent to extract gas from beneath the
plaintiffs’ land, but the plaintiffs again failed to expressly allege a physical
intrusion of any kind.83
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.84 In their
memoranda to the trial court, the plaintiffs suggested for the first time that
Southwestern might have caused a physical intrusion into the surface of
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
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their land, but they still did not expressly allege that an intrusion had
occurred.85 The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted
Southwestern’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the rule of
capture barred the plaintiffs’ claims.86
The plaintiffs appealed.87 The appellate court focused much of its
discussion on whether the rule of capture should apply in unconventional
reservoirs, where hydraulic fracturing is necessary in order to
economically produce oil or gas. The appellate court concluded that the
rule of capture should not apply if a company uses “artificial” means, such
as hydraulic fracturing, to increase flow.88
The appellate court noted that the plaintiffs did not seem to be basing
their claim on a contention that there was a physical intrusion, but the
appellate court also characterized the issue before it as whether a trespass
occurs when a defendant uses hydraulic fracturing in a way that extends
into an adjoining landowner’s property and results in the withdrawal of
natural gas from beneath that property.” The appellate court relied in part
on the dissenting opinion in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy
Trust and the decision in Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, which
each involved allegations that the defendant had caused a physical
intrusion into the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ land.89 The appellate court
reversed the trial court’s decision, stating that the plaintiffs’ “allegations”
were sufficient to preclude summary judgment.90
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, which was
argued before that court in September 2019.91 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted various curious aspects of the case below. For example, the
plaintiffs never alleged at the trial court level or at the appellate court
level—either in their pleadings or their briefing—that Southwestern had
caused a physical intrusion into the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ land.92 The
appellate court seemed to note this, but parts of the appellate court’s
opinion seemed to treat the case as if the plaintiffs had alleged such an
intrusion. The appellate court noted that nothing in the record showed how
far the fractures induced by Southwestern had extended, and a party that
bears the burden of proof generally must present some evidence to defeat

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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summary judgment, but the court held that plaintiffs’ “allegations” were
sufficient.93
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then analyzed the case. The court
stated that the appellate court was wrong to conclude that the rule of
capture would not apply when a defendant uses some artificial means, such
as hydraulic fracturing.94 The Supreme Court noted that drilling itself is an
artificial means.95 The court concluded, therefore, that if Southwestern did
not cause a physical intrusion into the subsurface of the plaintiffs’ land,
the rule of capture would apply and Southwestern would not have
conversion liability for drainage of natural gas, even if some of the gas that
Southwestern produced was drained from beneath the plaintiffs’ land.96
Further, in the absence of a physical intrusion, Southwestern would not
have liability for trespass.97
The court noted Southwestern’s “fallback” argument that it would not
be liable even if it did cause a physical intrusion because (Southwestern
contends) the rule of trespass would not apply in the same way far beneath
the surface as it does at the surface.98 The court stated, however, that it
would not resolve that issue because it was not presented to the court in
the petition for appeal.99 The court strongly implied that mere allegations
by the plaintiffs should not be able to defeat a motion for summary
judgment, and the court noted that the plaintiffs had not produced evidence
of a physical intrusion.100 Nevertheless, rather than enter a judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims, the court remanded for further
proceedings.101 The tenor of the court’s opinion seems to imply that, if
Southwestern files a motion seeking summary judgment on the grounds
that the plaintiffs’ have not produced evidence of a physical intrusion, the
onus will be on the plaintiffs to produce such evidence if they wish to
defeat the motion.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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C. A Landowner’s Right to Authorize Intrusion upon the Mineral Estate
Owner’s Minerals
When one person owns the “surface rights” for certain land, but
another person owns the “mineral estate” for the same land, they each have
a right to use the land. Sometimes, this leads to disputes as to whether one
person’s actions infringes the rights of the other, and occasionally, such
disputes result in one of the persons asserting a claim for trespass.
1. Background
In the United States, a landowner typically has the exclusive right to
conduct operations on and beneath his land to explore for and produce
minerals.102 But most states allow a landowner to sever this right from the
other benefits of ownership.103 Doing so creates a “split estate” situation
in which there are two estates in the land—one which is commonly called
the “surface estate”104 and another which is commonly called the “mineral
estate,”105 though occasionally it has been called a “subsurface estate.”106
The landowner can do this by granting a mineral estate to another person
or by selling the land and reserving the mineral estate for himself.107
The names “surface estate” and “subsurface estate” can be misleading.
Generally, the surface estate owner owns both the surface and most or all
of the subsurface. The less common term “subsurface estate,” which is
sometimes used in place of “mineral estate,” is misleading for a couple of
reasons. First, in some ways, the most important right that the owner of a
so-called “subsurface estate” typically has is the exclusive right to use the
land to explore for and produce minerals, as well as the right to own any
mineral reduced to actual possession. This right includes an “implied
102. See, e.g., LA. REV. STATS. §§ 31:5–31:6 (2019). In contrast, in much of
the world, this right belongs to the sovereign—that is, to the national government.
Keith B. Hall, An International Comparison of the Operatorship Provisions
Contained in Model Form Oil & Gas Joint Operating Agreements, 7 LSU J.
ENERGY L. RESOURCES 79, 88–89 (2019).
103. Louisiana is an exception. Its civil law property system does not follow
the common law “estates” system and does not allow a permanent severance of
mineral rights from surface rights. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v Salling’s Heirs,
91 So. 207 (La. 1922); Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 97 So. 666 (La. 1923).
104. See, e.g., Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d
39, 43 (Tex. 2017).
105. Id.
106. Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery v. Morgan, 745 N.E.2d 461,
478 (W. Va. 2013).
107. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
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easement” to use both the subsurface and the surface as reasonably
necessary to explore for and produce minerals, such as oil and gas.108
Second, as already noted, the surface estate owner will own most of
the subsurface. For example, the surface estate owner will own the
subsurface formations that do not contain oil and gas. And even if a
formation does contain oil and gas, the subsurface owner will own the rock
in which the oil and gas is found. Depending on the state jurisdiction, the
mineral estate owner may or may not own the oil and gas “in place” in the
subsurface. In some states, no one owns the oil and gas in place. Those
substances are not owned by anyone until they are reduced to possession.
In other states, including Texas, the owner of a mineral estate (or the
landowner if the land is not subject to a mineral estate) owns the oil and
gas itself while it remains in place,109 but the mineral estate owner will not
own the rock in which the oil or gas is found.
2. Recent Development—Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P
Onshore, LLC
This case involves two tracts and a conflict between the owners of the
surface and mineral estate.110 In particular, the dispute concerned the
tension between the surface estate owner’s ownership of the entire
subsurface, which includes the rock matrix in which oil or gas might be
found, and the mineral estate owner’s oil and gas rights, which includes
both the ownership of any oil or gas molecules found inside the rock

108. The legal instrument that creates the “split estate” situation may specify
the rights that the owner of the mineral estate will have to use the surface and
subsurface of the land to explore for and produce minerals. If the instrument does
not, the typical rule is that the owner of the mineral estate has an “implied
easement” to use the surface and subsurface of the land as reasonably necessary
to explore for and produce minerals. The instrument creating the mineral estate
may restrict (or expand) the extent of the mineral estate owner’s surface use rights,
but the default rule throughout the country seems to be that the mineral estate
owner can use the land as reasonably necessary. Early courts chose this as the
default rule because the mineral estate is of little value unless the mineral estate
owner could use the land to explore for and produce minerals.
109. This does not stop these “ownership in place” states from following the
rule of capture. They reconcile the rule of capture with ownership-in-place by
holding that a mineral estate owner or landowner owns the oil or gas beneath his
land so long as it remains beneath his land, but that ownership interest is lost if
the oil or gas migrates elsewhere.
110. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 43
(Tex. 2017).
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matrix and the exclusive right to explore for and produce those
substances.111
The first tract is the location of Briscoe Ranch. The surface estate of
that tract is owned by Briscoe Ranch, Inc. (Briscoe). The Hurd Family
owned the mineral estate, which was leased to Lightning Oil Company.
The neighboring tract is owned by the State of Texas, whose Park and
Wildlife Department operates the Chaparral Wildlife Management Area
there. The State granted a mineral lease to Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC.
The lease contained various restrictions on Anadarko’s use of the surface,
including a requirement that Anadarko use drilling locations outside the
Chaparral whenever feasible.
Anadarko made plans to drill to an area beneath the Chaparral, using
a surface location outside the area. To facilitate these plans, Anadarko
entered into a surface use agreement with Briscoe. The agreement gave
Anadarko the right to drill from the surface of Briscoe Ranch and through
its subsurface to reach the subsurface of the Chaparral. Under Anadarko’s
plans, the wellbores it drilled would pass through mineral-bearing
formations leased to Lightning.
Lightning objected and ultimately filed suit, seeking an injunction to
prevent Anadarko from drilling the wells. Lightning argued that the wells
planned by Anadarko would constitute a trespass on Lightning’s mineral
estate.112 In addition to alleging that the drilling would constitute a
physical intrusion, Lightning alleged that it would cause two harms—
Anadarko’s physical structures would interfere with Lightning’s future
mineral activities, and the drilling process itself would remove minerals
embedded in the drill cuttings (the rock chips created by the drill bit’s
passage through the rock).113 The district court dismissed Lightning’s
claim, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court agreed
to review the case.
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed the law of trespass, stating,
“Trespass to real property is an unauthorized entry upon the land of
another, and may occur when one enters—or causes something to enter—
another’s property.”114 The court also noted that “every unauthorized entry
upon land is a trespass, even if no damage is done or injury is slight.”115 A
property owner generally has the right to exclude others from entering or
using the property, but an owner’s right “does not necessarily include the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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right to exclude every invasion or interference” with his property.116 To
determine whether Lightning had a right to stop Anadarko’s activities, the
court considered the nature of the rights of a mineral estate owner, mineral
lessee, and surface owner.
Under Texas law, the owner of the mineral estate (such as the Hurd
family) owns oil and gas in place and has a possessory interest in that oil
and gas.117 A mineral lessee (such as Lightning) similarly has an
ownership and possessory interest.118 In addition, unless a mineral lease
restricts the mineral lessee’s use of the property, the lessee (or the mineral
estate owner in the absence of a lease) has an implied easement to use the
surface and subsurface of the leased premises as reasonably necessary to
explore for and produce minerals.119
The surface estate owner (such as Briscoe) owns the surface and
subsurface of the land, including subsurface rock formations that do not
contain oil and gas and the rock matrix that surrounds oil and gas in a
formation that contains those substances.120 But this does “not necessarily
mean [the surface owner] is entitled to make physical intrusions into
formations where minerals are located and remove some of the minerals—
as is probable if a well is drilled through such formations.”121 After
supplying this background analysis, the court turned to resolving the
parties’ dispute.
One of the harms alleged by Lightning was that Anadarko’s activities
might interfere with Lightning’s own future operations. This was a
plausible basis on which Lightning might build a claim for relief because
a mineral lessee such as Lightning generally has an implied easement to
use the leased premises as reasonably necessary to explore for and produce
minerals. The surface owner is obligated to respect this right, and
Anadarko would be obligated to respect this right too because Anadarko’s
rights emanated from the surface owner.122
But the surface owner generally is entitled to conduct whatever
activities it wishes on its land, provided that its activities do not interfere
with the mineral lessee’s ability to explore for and produce minerals. The
court concluded that Lightning’s assertion that Anadarko’s drilling might

116. Id.
117. Id. at 48.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 47 (“the surface owner owns and controls the mass of earth
undergirding the surface”).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 49.
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interfere with Lightning’s future mineral activities was speculative.123 If
Lightning had shown that Anadarko’s activities would actually interfere
with Lightning’s operations, Lightning might have been entitled to relief
(though an analysis under the accommodation doctrine might be necessary
to answer the question definitively), but Lightning’s speculative concerns
could not justify relief.124
The court then turned to Lightning’s other claim of harm—that
Anadarko’s drilling plans would cause loss of some of the minerals in
which Lightning had a possessory and ownership interest. In particular,
Anadarko’s drilling would cause a loss of the oil or gas embedded in the
drill cuttings—that is, the rock displaced by the drilling itself. The court
recognized that such a loss as an actual harm to Lightning, though a small
one. The court stated, “Whether the small amount of minerals lost through
that process will support a trespass action must, in the end, be answered
by balancing the interest involved . . . .”125
The Texas Supreme Court noted that horizontal drilling can be the
most efficient means of exploiting oil and gas resources, but that “[i]t can
take several thousand feet” to transfer the wellbore from a vertical
direction to a horizontal direction.126 Further, it may be impossible to
recover oil and gas from this transition interval using the well whose
wellbore is turning from vertical to horizontal because this portion of the
well’s casing is not typically perforated.127 Thus, the hydrocarbons in the
transition interval may go unrecovered unless a separate well is drilled to
target those minerals. Failing to recover the minerals would run counter to
the policy to encourage production of mineral, but drilling a separate well
to recover the hydrocarbons in the transition interval would run counter to
a public policy to avoid drilling an excessive number of wells.
Suppose, however, an operator having a right to produce minerals
from Blackacre, but not from the neighboring property, could start drilling
its well from the neighboring property. The operator could drill the well
so that the non-producing transition interval from vertical to horizontal
drilling could be completed while the drill bit was still within the
subsurface of the neighboring property, before the drilling reached the
subsurface of Blackacre.128 Thus, the entirety of the wellbore drilled within
the subsurface of Blackacre could consist of a horizontal lateral that is
123. Thus, if Lightning had been able to show actual interference with its
exploration or production activities, it might have been entitled to relief.
124. Lightning Oil Co, 520 S.W.3d at 49–50.
125. Id. at 50.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id.
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suitable for perforation and recovery of minerals. The Texas Supreme
Court summarized: “Such drilling activities allow for recovering the most
minerals while drilling the fewest wells. And this court has always viewed
waste-reducing innovations favorably.”129 The court then concluded that
the balancing of interests weighed in favor of denying relief to Lightning.
The court explained:
Balanced against the small loss of minerals a lessee such as
Lightning will suffer, if drilling through the minerals is
determined to be a non-actionable interference with its property
rights, is the longstanding policy of this state to encourage
maximum recovery of minerals and to minimize waste. In that
context, we have no doubt that individual interests in the oil and
gas lost through being brought to the surface as part of drilling a
well are outweighed by the interests of the industry as a whole and
society in maximizing oil and gas recovery. That being so, we
conclude that the loss of minerals Lightning will suffer by a well
being drilled through its mineral estate is not a sufficient injury to
support a claim for trespass. Accordingly, such a loss will not
support injunctive relief. Lightning’s claim of an impending
trespass and its application for injunctive relief on that basis are
rejected.130
This result is in tension with the general rule that an owner and possessor
of property has a trespass action even when the trespass causes no harm.
Several factors likely contribute to this result. First, Lightning’s loss would
be miniscule. Second, public policy favors allowing drilling of the sort
planned by Anadarko. The court expressly noted both of those factors in
discussing its balancing of interests. Third, courts have previously held
that the right to exclude others—one of the traditional sticks of
“ownership”—is less absolute for spaces high above or below the surface
than at the surface.131 Although the court did not note this factor in the part
129. Id. Of course, the well still would not be perforated in the transition
interval and thus still not would recover any oil or gas from that area, but that area
would be beneath the neighboring property, where the operator had not right to
produce minerals anyway. Further, it still would be necessary to drill another well
to produce the hydrocarbons found in that area, but another well by a different
company would have been necessary anyway given that the operator of Blackacre
has no rights to produce hydrocarbons from the subsurface of the neighboring
tract.
130. Id. at 51.
131. Lightning Oil quoted a statement form a prior Texas Supreme Court
decision stating that, “Wheeling an airplane across the surface of one’s property
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of its decision discussing the balancing of interests, the court noted it when
discussing the basic rules governing trespass actions.132
Fourth, the relationship between the surface owner and mineral estate
owner is somewhat different than the relationship between owners of two
neighboring tracts. If one person owns Blackacre and a different person
owns a contiguous tract called Whiteacre, a property line separates the
location of their possessory interests. One person has an interest on one
side of the line, and the other person has a possessory interest in the land
on the other side. In contrast, when there is a split estate, the surface owner
owns the rock matrix in which any oil and gas is embedded, but the mineral
estate owner owns the hydrocarbon molecules that are located in the small
pore spaces of the rock. Thus, the surface owner and mineral owner have
possessory interests in substances that are intermingled at a microscopic
level. Arguably, this supports a balancing of interests, rather than an
absolute rule.
Finally, Lightning sought injunctive relief, rather than a damages
award. The Texas Supreme Court, in rejecting the arguments that it
considered speculative—the possibility that Anadarko’s drilling might
interfere with future activities that Lightning might decide to undertake—
stated the basic principle that injunctive relief is not appropriate unless the
relief is necessary to prevent “imminent, irreparable harm.”133 In rejecting
Lightning’s arguments based on the small loss of hydrocarbons from the
drill cuttings, the court used somewhat broad language, stating that, given
the required balancing of interests, such a loss is not sufficient “to support
a claim for trespass.”134 Such language would seem broad enough to also
bar a damages claim, but perhaps the language was overbroad. As the court
noted in the very next sentence, the relief Lightning was seeking, and
which it was denied, was injunctive relief.
D. Pooling as a Basis for Authority to Use Land
An oil and gas lessee generally has no right to use the leased tract to
support operations to produce oil and gas from another tract. If the lessee
without permission is a trespass; flying the plane through the airspace two miles
above the property is not.” Id. at 46 (quoting Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2008)). That prior decision, which involved
subsurface rights, rather than airspace rights, went on to state: “The law of trespass
need no more be the same two miles below the surface than two miles above.”
Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 11.
132. Lightning Oil Co., 520 S.W.3d at 46.
133. Id. at 49.
134. Id. at 51.

342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd 178

5/21/20 8:23 AM

2020]

TRESPASS LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

533

uses the leased tract in such a way, the lessee may be liable for trespass.
However, one of the legal effects of pooling is that the lessee or other
operator of a pooled unit that includes the leased tract typically has the
right to use the leased tract for unit operations, even if the unit operations
involve production of minerals from other tracts in the unit. But sometimes
disputes arise regarding the extent of a unit operator’s rights to use a tract
without incurring trespass liability.
1. Background
Typically, a mineral estate owner or mineral lessee can use the land
subject to the mineral estate or lease as reasonably necessary for the
exploration and production of minerals from the land that is subject to the
estate or lease. A mineral estate owner or lessee typically would not have
the authority to use the leased premises to produce minerals from other
lands.135 But if pooling is implemented by agreement or by order of a
regulator for a drilling unit that includes multiple tracts, the pooling
typically has the effect of treating the tracts within the unit as a single tract
for purposes of oil and gas production, with a portion of production
revenue and a portion of costs being allocated to each tract. In such cases,
a mineral estate owner or mineral lessee typically can use the leased
premises to support production from anywhere in the drilling unit. Indeed,
the unit operator may be able to use any tract in the unit even if the operator
does not have a lease for the tract. Various disputes can arise, though,
including disputes regarding a mineral estate owner’s (or his lessee’s)
authority to agree to pooling that would allow such use of the tract, and
disputes regarding a unit operator to use unleased tracts to support unit
production when a regulator’s order has implemented pooling.
a. The Development of Statutory Pooling
Statutory pooling is a regulatory response to certain problems that can
arise from tract-by-tract ownership of oil and gas rights and the rule of
capture.

135. Of course, the act creating the mineral estate could expressly grant more
the owner of the mineral estate the right to use the land to support production from
other lands, but that would be unusual and the default rule would be that the
mineral estate owner has no such rights. Similarly, a mineral lease could expressly
grant the lessee the right to use the leased premises to support production from
other tracts. A clause giving the lessee the right to use the leased premises to
support producing from nearby or adjacent tracts is an “adjacent lands” clause.
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i. Tract-by-Tract Ownership of Mineral Rights
Ownership of land confers a bundle of rights upon the landowner.136
In the United States, this bundle of rights generally includes the exclusive
right to conduct oil and gas operations on and beneath the land.137 Because
each landowner has this exclusive right, the ownership of mineral rights,
like the ownership of surface rights, typically differs from one tract of land
to the next.
A landowner typically has the freedom to sever these oil and gas rights
from the remainder of the bundle of rights that belong to the landowner.138
For example, a landowner can bring about a permanent severance of
mineral rights, either by granting a severed mineral estate to some other
person or by selling the land and reserving a severed mineral estate for
himself or herself.139 But such severances do not alter the fact that the
person who owns oil and gas rights will typically be different from one
tract to the next.
ii. Addressing the Fugacious Nature of Oil & Gas with the Rule of
Capture
Oil and gas are typically found in the pore spaces of underground rock
formations. When a well is drilled into such a formation, the oil or gas
generally can flow through the rock to the well by traveling through
interconnections between the pores. In this manner, oil and gas often can
flow hundreds of feet. For this reason, and because a reservoir of oil or gas
often will extend through the subsurface of separately owned tracts of
land, a portion of the oil or gas that reaches the well sometimes has
originated from beneath a neighboring tract. This can lead to “drainage”
disputes between neighboring landowners.
136. “Bundle of rights” is a commonly-used description of the rights that a
person obtains when she becomes owner of property. See, e.g., Evanston Ins. Co.
v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 377, 382–83 (Tex. 2012) and sources cited
therein.
137. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Tomlinson, 859 P.2d 1088, 1094 (Okla. 1993); Cal.
Minerals v. County of Kern, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); LA. REV.
STAT. § 31:6. This is the general rule in the United States, but it is not the global
norm. In most other countries, the national government owns the right to produce
minerals. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS IN A NUTSHELL 8 (5th ed. 2009).
138. This is such a well-settled principle that it is difficult to find cases in
which courts actually state the principle, rather than simply applying it. See, e.g.,
Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 167 P. 468 (Okla. 1917).
139. Id.

342638-LSU_EL_8-2_Text.indd 180

5/21/20 8:23 AM

2020]

TRESPASS LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

535

Figure 1. Well on Blackacre drains oil from beneath neighboring tract.

As courts began confronting this issue in the late 1800s,140 different
jurisdictions reached the same result: if a defendant drills a well on
property where he owns the mineral rights, he would not have liability to
a plaintiff who owns a neighboring tract, even if the well drains oil or gas
from beneath the plaintiff’s tract. This result became known as the “rule
of capture.”141

140. See, e.g., Kelly v. Ohio Oil, 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897); see also Barnard
v. Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907).
141. See, e.g., Gadeco, LLC v. Indus. Comm’n of State, 812 N.W.2d 405, 407
(N.D. 2012); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 13
(Tex. 2008); Bonner v. Okla. Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1185 (Okl. 1993);
Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co., 277 So. 2d 218, 220 (La. Ct. App. 1973). Several
commentators have noted that the rule of capture has been universally adopted in
the United States. See, e.g., PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER,
WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 204.4; TERENCE DAINTITH, FINDERS
KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW OF CAPTURE SHAPED THE WORLD OIL INDUSTRY 7 (RFF
Press 2010).
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iii. Problems Arising from the Rule of Capture
Although the rule of capture has been universally adopted, it leads to
three significant problems. First, it gives each landowner an incentive to
drill as many wells as possible near property lines, in order to produce the
available oil or gas before his neighbor does. In other words, it encourages
the drilling of more wells than are necessary to efficiently drain the oil or
gas in an area.142 Because drilling wells is expensive, excess drilling is a
form of economic waste.

Figure 2. Closely spaced wells at Spindle Top (Texas) in early 1900s.

142. Gadeco, LLC, 812 N.W. 2d 405, 407 (N.D. 2012); Nunez v. Wainoco Oil
& Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955, 960 (La. 1986) (rule of capture encouraged
indiscriminate drilling).
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Figure 3. Closely spaced wells in Pennsylvania in late 1800s.

Second, the rule of capture encourages the owners of wells to produce
oil from each well as rapidly as possible, in order to recover the oil before
a neighbor does. This can be a problem because rapid production can harm
the reservoir. It is never possible to recover 100% of the oil in a formation,
but it is often possible to recover a larger fraction of the oil if the oil is
produced at a moderate pace, rather than at the maximum possible rate.143

143. Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 960 (referring to diminished ultimate recovery).
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Figure 4. Second sketch from top showing bypassing of pockets of oil by overly
rapid production.

The third significant problem associated with the rule of capture is
that, notwithstanding the availability of a landowner’s self-help remedy of
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drilling his or her own wells, there is sometimes a concern that the rule of
capture is unfair.144
iv. Pooling—A Regulatory Response to Problems Associated with the
Rule of Capture
The problems associated with the rule of capture became evident by
the early 1900s. Gradually, a consensus developed that regulation was
needed to address these problems. As a result, during the 1920s through
1940s, a number of states enacted legislation empowering state agencies
to take action to combat the inefficiency and waste that resulted from
competition to produce oil and gas from the same formations. 145 Such
measures often are called “conservation” provisions because they tend to
minimize the waste of resources—the waste inherent in the expense of
drilling an excessive number of wells and the waste inherent in the lower
ultimate recovery of oil from a reservoir that can result when companies
produce oil at such a fast rate that the reservoir is harmed.146
144. Cf. id. at 960 (noting that one goal of conservation regulation can be “to
insure a fair and reasonable participation, by the surface owners in the common
pool within the producing area”).
145. AM. BAR ASS’N, CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS: A LEGAL HISTORY 3
(Robert E. Sullivan ed. 1960).
146. North Dakota’s statutes generally are typical of those found in states with
oil and gas production. A state statute proclaims it to be in the “to be in the public
interest to foster, to encourage, and to promote the development, production, and
utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the state in such a manner as will
prevent waste.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-01. In turn, “waste” is defined to
include “locating, spacing, . . . [or] operating . . . any oil or gas well or wells in a
manner which causes, or tends to cause, reduction in the quantity of oil or gas
ultimately recoverable.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-02. North Dakota law then
states that “[w]aste of oil and gas is prohibited.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-03;
see also N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-06 (regulation prohibiting waste). Further,
the North Dakota Industrial Commission is given authority to enforce the state’s
oil and gas laws and to investigate and “determine whether waste exists or is
imminent or whether other facts exist which justify action by the commission.”
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-04(1). The NDIC also is given authority to regulate the
“spacing of wells.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-04(1)(b)(3). The state’s oil and gas
statutes provide that the NDIC “shall set the spacing of wells” as “necessary to
prevent waste, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, or to protect correlative
rights.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07. Most other oil and gas producing states
have nearly identical provisions and have had such provisions for decades.
Accordingly, such provisions have had time to affect the customs, practices, and
expectations within the oil and gas industry.
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Spacing rules are one of the most common types of conservation
rules.147 Spacing rules attempt to ensure that wells are spaced sufficiently
far apart that they are not competing to drain oil or gas from the same
portion of a common formation. For example, spacing rules often are
written so as to prohibit the drilling of more than one well within a given
number of acres—presumably, the maximum number of acres that can be
efficiently drained by one well.148 Alternatively, rather than specifying a
particular number of acres for each well, the rules can be written so that
they require wells to be located or spaced no less than a specified,
minimum distance apart (presumably, a distance that would result in wells
being far enough apart that they are not draining from the same area).149
Thus, the use of spacing rules demonstrates the regulators’ intent to
prevent the drilling of more wells than are necessary to efficiently and
economically drain an area.
Yet another common type of conservation rule— statutory pooling—
addresses a problem associated with spacing rules.150 In particular,
statutory pooling addresses the “small tract” problem. An example can
illustrate this problem. Suppose that the applicable spacing rules require a
minimum of 640 acres per well. This may work fine if all the tracts in an
147. The strong public policy favoring spacing rules is demonstrated by the
fact that virtually every state with oil and gas activity has spacing rules. See, e.g.,
ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 400-1-2.02; ARK. ADMIN. CODE 178.00.1-B-3; 14 CAL.
CODE REG. §§ 1721–1721.7; 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:318; KAN. ADMIN.
REG. § 82-3-109; LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX § 1905; 26 MISS. ADMIN.
CODE Pt. 2, Rule 1.8; MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.702; N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07
and N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-18; N.M. ADMIN. CODE 19.15.13; OHIO
ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-04; OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 165:10-1-21.; 25 PA. CODE §§
79.21–79.28; ADMIN. R. S.D. § 74:12:02:04 (oil) and 74:12:02:05 (gas); TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.37(a); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. § 649-3-2; W. VA. CODE R. § 391-4.2; WYO. R. AND REG. 055.0001.3 §2.
148. For example, North Dakota Administrative Code § 43-02-03-18 specifies
spacing requirements that depend on three factors that help determine the area is
drained by a well—namely, the well’s depth (above or below a specified
formation), product (oil or gas), and configuration (vertical or horizontal). For
example, the rule requires that at least 160 acres be allowed for each deep, vertical,
oil well. The rule does so by specifying that either a government quarter section
or “equivalent lots” must be devoted to such a well.
149. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 1905; N.M. ADMIN. CODE
§ 19.15.15.9; OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-1-21; 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §
3.37(a)(1).
150. The most frequently used term for this sort of regulatory action is “pooling,”
though “integration” sometimes is used. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (title
of section refers to “integration,” but text of statute refers to “pooling”).
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area are 640 acres or larger. The landowners who have 640-acre tracts can
drill one well. Landowners who have 1280 acres can drill two wells, and
so forth. But suppose four neighboring landowners—Adams, Brown,
Carter, and Davis—each own a 160-acre tract, with the total acreage
owned by the four of them therefore equaling 640 acres. Would the 640acre spacing rule mean that none of the four can drill because no single
one of them has 640 acres? If so, an important property right has been
undermined and perhaps “taken” by regulation.151
In the alternative, does it mean that the first of the four to start drilling
is allowed to drill and keep all production (as provided by the rule of
capture), but that the other three are barred from drilling, thereby resulting
in there being only one well in the 640 acres? If so, the purpose of the
spacing rule has been preserved, but an important property right of three
of the four has been abrogated.
An alternative method to address this small tract problem—a method
now authorized in almost every state that has oil and gas activity, is for the
state’s oil and gas regulatory agency to issue “pooling” orders. 152 A
pooling order combines multiple tracts that are individually too small to
justify their own drilling permit into a single unit that is large enough to
justify a well under the applicable spacing rules.153 When such a pooling
order is entered, the order compels joint operations of all the oil and gas
interests within the unit, with one party being designated as the “operator”
who will conduct operations on behalf of all parties. Pursuant to the
pooling order, a portion of the costs and revenue from oil and gas
operations will be allocated to each tract in the pooled unit, and the
regulatory agency will limit the number of wells allowed, with the classic
model of a pooled unit being an area in which only one well will be
allowed. Many states have a public policy favoring pooling because of the
efficacy of pooling in promoting conservation. Indeed, in some states, if
separately owned tracts of land are contained within the area in which only
151. This is not meant to express a judgment on whether this would constitute
a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
152. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 30:10 (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08
(2020).
153. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07(1) (2020) (spacing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3808-08 (2020) (pooling). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116(3) (2017); WYO.
STAT. § 30-5-109(c)(1) (2019); LA. REV. STAT. 30:9(B) (2015); N.M. Stat. § 70-217(B) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(a) (2012); UTAH CODE § 40-6-6(1)
(2019); WYO. STAT. § 30-5-109(a) (2019). Often, “drilling unit” is contemplated to
be the maximum area that can be drained by one well. See, e.g., PATRICK H. MARTIN
& BRUCE M KRAMER, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS at 726 (definition of
“drilling unit”) and 918 (definition of “spacing unit”) (14th ed. 2009).
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one well will be allowed (the so-called “drilling unit” or “spacing unit”),
statutes often provide that the regulator “shall” enter a pooling order unless
the owners of the tracts already entered a voluntary pooling agreement.154
Within the United States, a consensus exists that conservation
regulations promote an important public policy. Because of this consensus,
a substantial amount of similarity exists across the nation in the various
states’ oil and gas laws. For example, the laws of many states prohibit
“waste,” with waste encompassing two concepts—physical waste, in the
form of practices that result in less production of hydrocarbons and
economic waste, in the form of money spent on drilling of more wells than
necessary to efficiently recover the hydrocarbons in an area. Further, many
states give their oil and gas regulatory agency the task of promulgating
regulations and issuing orders to minimize physical waste and avoid the
drilling of unnecessary wells. Pooling is one of the major tools that
regulators use in seeking to minimize waste.
b. Voluntary Pooling
Persons holding mineral rights can enter voluntary pooling
agreements that have much the same effect as pooling orders issued by a
regulator. Often, oil and gas leases delegate pooling authority to the lessee.
c. Authority of a Mineral Estate Owner to Pool
There is relatively little case law that expressly addresses the question
of whether a mineral estate owner or his lessee can enter a pooling
agreement that would have the effect of allowing the leased premises to
be used to support the production of oil and gas from within the drilling
unit, but outside the tract covered by the mineral estate or lease. One of
the few cases to do so is from the Texas Supreme Court—Key Operating
& Equipment, Inc. v. Hegar.155 In this case, Key Operating and Equipment,
Inc. (“Key”) held a lease and operated a well on the sixty-acre Richardson
Tract. Key also held a lease and operated a well on the 191-acre
Curbo/Rosenbaum Tract, which was contiguous to the Richardson Tract.
In 1994, Key built a road on the Curbo/Rosenbaum Tract to access the
well on that tract and also the well on the Richardson Tract.
In 2000, the well on the Curbo/Rosenbaum Tract quit producing and
Key Operating’s lease on that tract expired. But the same year, Key
acquired a lease from individuals who owned a 12.5% interest in the
154. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 30:10 (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08
(2020).
155. 435 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2014).
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mineral estate for the Curbo/Rosenbaum Tract. The new lease contained a
pooling clause, and Key pooled under a portion of the Curbo/Rosenbaum
Tract with a portion of the Richardson Tract. The pooled area included the
access road on the Curbo/Rosenbaum Tract and the well on the Richardson
Tract. Two years later, Will and Loree Hegar bought eighty-five acres of
the Curbo/Rosenbaum Tract, including the portion that contained the
access road.
For several years, the Hegars took no action to prevent Key from using
the road across their land to access the well on the Richardson Tract. But
later, after Key drilled an additional well on the Richardson Tract and
Key’s use of the road increased, the Hegars filed suit, asserting that Key’s
use of the road constituted a trespass. They offered expert testimony that
the wells on the Richardson Tract drained only a small area that did not
reach the Hegar property.156 The trial court entered an order enjoining Key
from using the road that crossed the Hegars’ property and issued findings
of fact that included a finding that the wells on the Richardson Tract did
not drain hydrocarbons from the Hegar Tract.157
Key appealed. The appellate court initially reversed the trial court’s
decision, but then granted rehearing, withdrew its initial decision, and
affirmed the lower court’s ruling.158 The appellate court held that, because
the mineral lease that contained the pooling clause did not appear in the
Hegars’ chain of title, Key could not rely on the pooling clause for
authority to use the Hegars’ land to facilitate production from a well on
the Richardson Tract. Basically, the appellate court reasoned that, in order
for the Hegars to be bound by the pooling provision, the mineral lease
containing the provision would had to have been granted by a landowner
prior to the creation of a split estate. The Texas Appellate Court stated:
We agree that Key Operating and the Key brothers cannot
contractually expand their surface rights against the Hegars in a lease
and a pooling agreement executed after the mineral and surface
estates were severed. If the Key brothers’ lease, which authorizes
Key Operating to pool the Curbo tract, had been executed before or
at the time the mineral and surface estates were severed, this lease
would have been part of the Hegars’ chain of title and the Hegars
would have taken their title to the surface estate subject to the lease.159

156.
157.
158.
159.
2013).
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The Texas Supreme Court agreed to review the case and rejected the
appellate court’s reasoning. The Texas Supreme Court noted, “The
primary legal consequence of pooling is that ‘production and operations
anywhere on the pooled unit are treated as if they have taken place on each
tract within the unit.’”160 Thus, “production from the pooled part of the
Richardson Tract was legally also production from the pooled part of the
Hegar tract.”161 It was undisputed that, by virtue of its lease that covered
the Hegar Tract, Key would have the right to use the Hegar Tract to
produce minerals from beneath that tract. Given this right, and the
principle that production from anywhere on the pooled unit is treated as if
it came from each tract in the unit, Key had the right to use the road
crossing the Hegar Tract to access the unit well on the Richardson Tract.162
The court also noted that a public policy of Texas is to encourage
production of minerals.163 Allowing a surface owner to block a mineral
estate owner’s pooling agreement likely would discourage production,
given the efficiencies that can be achieved when pooling is used. Further,
another public policy of Texas is to prevent waste,164 and pooling is one
method to prevent waste.165 Several other jurisdictions also have a policy
of encouraging production,166 and virtually all jurisdictions prohibit
waste.167
d. Authority of Operator of a Unit Created by a Regulator to Use
Unleased Premises
When a pooling is ordered, this generally gives the unit operator the
authority to use the subsurface, and perhaps the surface, of any tract in the
unit, even if the operator does not have a lease on the tract. In Nunez v.
Wainoco Oil & Gas Co.,168 the Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation
entered orders creating a drilling unit, ordering pooling, and issuing a
permit that authorized Wainoco to drill a well that became the unit well.
160. Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2014).
161. Id. at 799.
162. Id. at 800.
163. Id. at 798 (“The policy of Texas is to encourage the recovery of minerals
. . . .”). This is also the public policy in several other jurisdictions. Cf. Jameson v.
Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Ark. 1980).
164. Id. (“the Legislature has made waste in the recovery of oil and gas
unlawful”).
165. Id. (“Pooling is one method to prevent waste.”).
166. Cf. Jameson, 609 S.W.2d at 351.
167. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 30:2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-03.
168. 488 So. 2d 955 (La. 1986).
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Wainoco began drilling from a surface location on a tract it had under
lease, near the property line separating that tract from a tract that was part
of the unit, but on which Wainoco did not have a lease. After the well was
completed, a directional survey indicated that the drilling had deviated
from vertical and that the well had bottomed about four or five feet inside
the subsurface of the unleased tract. The owner of that tract brought a
trespass action against Wainoco and other defendants who owned mineral
interests in the unit, seeking an order that required the operator to remove
the wellbore.
The district court dismissed the action on procedural grounds, but the
appellate court reversed and remanded for a resolution of the trespass
claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review and dismissed the
case, but on different grounds than the district court had done so.
The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that compulsory pooling and
unitization converts the separate exploration and development rights held
by different persons within the drilling unit into a common interest for the
drilling and development of the unit.169 The court described the common
interest as “a departure from the traditional notions of private property.”170
The court then explained that this departure is justified as a “reasonable
exercise of the police power” because oil and gas “migrate to points of
lower pressure caused by . . . drilling,” so that one person’s production of
oil or gas affects “the correlative rights” of others who have exploration
and development rights that apply to the “common reservoir.”171 Indeed,
pooling “protect[s] private property [by] preventing it from being taken
by one of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of the
others.”172
The court noted that this ruling “supercede[d] in part” Louisiana’s rule
that the surface owner also owns the subsurface, and that the trespass
alleged by the plaintiff was a subsurface trespass, not a surface trespass.
The court then concluded: “Since established private property law
concepts, such as trespass, have been superceded in part by Louisiana’s
Conservation Law when a unit has been created by order of the
Commissioner, we do not find that a legally actionable trespass has
occurred in this instance.”173
In a subsequent dispute between Nunez and Wainoco, the Louisiana
Third Circuit applied the same principle in concluding that unitization
orders and the grant of a drilling permit for a particular location can also
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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alter the rules relating to surface trespass.174 In that subsequent dispute,
Nunez complained about Wainoco using a portion of his land while
drilling a well just on the other side of the property line.175 Using a portion
of Nunez’s surface during the drilling process had been necessary because,
although the well site was not on Nunez’s property, the site designated on
the drilling permit was near the property line.176 The appellate court stated
that an operator might be required to compensate the non-consenting
landowner for any damages to his property, but the mere use of his land is
not a basis for trespass liability if use of the land is necessary in order to
drill a unit well at the location specified by the Commissioner of
Conservation.177
Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the operator of
a pooled unit even has the right to drill a unit well at a surface location
owned by a landowner who refuses to give his consent,178 though the
owner might be entitled to compensation for the value of such use under
the Takings Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution.179 Further, the North
Dakota Supreme Court has held that, when the state’s regulators have
created a compulsory unit, an operator does not incur liability for trespass
by drilling a horizontal well beneath the property of an unleased owner
without that owner’s consent.180
2. Recent Developments Relating to Pooling
At least two recent developments relating to pooling are relevant to a
discussion of trespass claims. One of these is a case from West Virginia
regarding the extent of a mineral estate owner’s right to pool. The other
relates to an amendment of a Colorado statute relating to pooling.

174. Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co. 606 So. 2d 1320, 1325 (La. App. Ct.
3d Cir. 1992).
175. Id. at 1323.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1326–27.
178. Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Rein, 534 P.2d 1277 (Okla. 1975).
179. Cormack v. Wil-Mc Corp., 661 P.2d 525, 526–27 (Okla. 1983) (citing
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 23).
180. Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841, 846 (N.D. 1997).
The cases discussed in this section of the Article do not figure prominently in the
eventual “Model” that this Article suggests is the appropriate synthesis of existing
subsurface trespass rules, but these cases support the conclusion that that are
numerous exceptions to a literal application of the ad coelum doctrine.
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a. Recent Developments—A Mineral Estate Owner’s Right to Pool
In 2019, the West Virginia Supreme Court decided EQT Production
Co. v. Crowder181 and reached a decision that seems to directly conflict to
the result reached by the Texas Supreme Court in Key Operating.
The relevant facts in Crowder begin in 1901. As of that year, Joseph
and Bell Carr owned a 351-acre tract—the “Carr Tract”—in Dodridge
County, West Virginia. They also owned the mineral rights associated
with the tract. In 1901, they granted EQT’s predecessor-in-interest an oil
and gas lease covering the Carr Tract. The lease was written so that it
would last for a primary term and “as long as oil or gas . . . is produced”
from the Carr Tract.182 The lease did not contain a pooling clause. The
lessee established production and the lease remained in effect as of
2019.183
Until 1936, the Carrs and their successors in title continued to own the
Carr Tract, as well the landowners’ interest in minerals, subject to the 1901
oil and gas lease.184 In 1936, the then owner of the 351-acre Carr Tract
created a split estate by selling a surface estate, while retaining a mineral
estate.185 In essence, the seller retained the lessor royalty rights under the
lease, the reversionary interest, and minerals not covered by the 1901
lease.186 These rights were reserved as to the entire Carr Tract.
By the mid-1970s, the surface estate for this land had been partitioned
into several smaller parcels.187 A married couple, Margot Beth Crowder
and David Wentz, acquired the surface estate for one of the parcels in
1975. They built a house on the tract and moved into it in 1977, but in
2003, the couple divorced.188 They then portioned their land into smaller
tracts. As of the time of trial, Mr. Wentz owned two of those smaller tracts
and Ms. Crowder owned one.189
As of 2011, Patty and Keith Crihfield owned the mineral estate for the
entire 351-acre Carr Tract and EQT owned the rights of the lessee under
the lease. That year, the Crihfields and EQT entered an agreement to
amend the 1901 lease.190 The amendments included the addition of a
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
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clause that gave EQT the authority to pool or unitize the Carr Tract with
other lands.
Relying on the pooling clause, EQT made plans to use the surface of
the tracts owned by Ms. Crowder and Mr. Wentz to drill horizontal wells
that would recover minerals from beneath portions of the Carr Tract, as
well as neighboring tracts that had been pooled with the Carr Tract. In
2012, a lawyer representing Ms. Crowder and Mr. Wentz sent a letter to
EQT, contending that EQT did not have the right to use their tracts to
facilitate the production of oil and gas from outside the 351-acre Carr
Tract.191 EQT disagreed, and in 2013 used portions of the plaintiffs’ tracts
to drill horizontal wells that extended beyond the Carr Tract.192
The plaintiffs sued EQT, arguing that the company committed a
trespass by using their land to produce minerals from beneath land outside
the Carr Tract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, holding that EQT had committed a trespass. Later, the trial court
held a trial to determine the quantum of damages and entered a judgment
awarding damages based on a jury verdict. EQT appealed.
EQT argued on appeal that it had authority to use the plaintiffs’ tracts
in the way it did based on the pooling clause in its amended lease with the
owners of the mineral estate for the Carr Tract.193 The West Virginia
191. Id. Actually, the lawyer’s letter apparently contended that EQT did not
have the right to use the tracts owned by Ms. Crowder and Mr. Wentz to produce
minerals from outside their tracts, but that contention was clearly wrong. When a
lessor grants an oil and gas lease covering a tract of land, a subsequent subdivision
of the surface estate does not divide the lease. By the time this dispute reached the
West Virginia Supreme Court, the plaintiffs no longer contended that EQT could
not use their land as reasonably necessary to produce minerals from other portions
of the Carr Tract, though they continued to contend—ultimately, successfully—
that EQT did not have the right to use their tracts to drill a horizontal well that
would extend and produce minerals beyond the Carr Tract.
192. Id. at 804.
193. Id. at 810. EQT raised two defenses. One was its right to pool. Second,
under well-established oil and gas law principles, the owner of a mineral estate
covering a tract has an implied easement to use the surface and subsurface of the
tract as reasonably necessary to explore and produce minerals from the tract. EQT
argued that it was reasonably necessary, in order to produce minerals from
beneath the Carr Tract, to produce those minerals via a horizontal well that
extended and produced minerals from beyond the tract. The West Virginia
Supreme Court did not seem to squarely address that issue. The court stated the
well-settled proposition that a mineral estate owner’s implied easement is not
sufficient to give that owner the right to use the tract in order to produce minerals
from another tract. But here, EQT was not merely arguing that, in order to produce
minerals from leases EQT held outside the Carr Tract, it was reasonably necessary
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Supreme Court disagreed.194 The court noted that the surface estate and
mineral estate were severed in 1936, and that the 1901 oil and gas lease
was not amended to include a pooling clause until 2011, when the mineral
estate owner and EQT reached that agreement. The West Virginia
Supreme Court stated:
[I]n 2011, the owners of the mineral estate no longer owned the
right to use the surface estate for exploration on and production
from neighboring tracts. Because the mineral estate was severed
from the surface estate in 136, that right belonged to the plaintiffs
or, more specifically, was a right attached to their surface estate.
Hence, the mineral owners could not have conveyed that right to
EQT in the 2011 amendment.195
The Crowder decision is potentially very significant. Under a very narrow
reading, the case could merely mean that, if a mineral lease that lacks a
pooling clause exists at the time that a split estate is created, the owner of
the mineral estate in West Virginia will lack the authority to amend the
lease to authorize the lessee to use the leased premises to drill horizontal
laterals that extend beyond the leased premises. However, the reasoning
stated in the court’s opinion does not seem to justify this most narrow
reasoning. The decision leaves various questions unanswered, but the
decision could be read as meaning that, unless the instrument creating a
split estate expressly grants the mineral estate owner the right to pool, the
mineral estate owner generally will not be able to use the leased premises
(or authorize the use of the leased premises) to support operations for a
pooled unit, whether or not the wellbore extends into the subsurface of a
neighboring tract.196
to use the plaintiffs’ land. Rather, EQT seemed to argue that, in order to produce
minerals from beneath the Carr Tract itself, it was reasonably necessary to use the
plaintiffs’ land to drill a horizontal lateral that produced minerals from beneath
the Carr Tract and neighboring tracts simultaneously.
194. Id. at 810–11.
195. Id.
196. The premise of such a position would be that, because a portion of the
minerals that the wellbore and surface equipment are handling will be attributed
to other tracts, the operations constitute a trespass to that extent. Crowder leaves
various questions unanswered. One is the possibility just mentioned. What if the
lessee in Crowder had created a pooled unit, then drilled a vertical well for the
pooled unit, using the plaintiffs’ land? Would the fact that some of the production
from the well would be attributed to portions of the pooled unit outside the Carr
Tract have meant that the unit operations constituted a trespass? What if the 1901
lease had terminated? Could the mineral estate owner grant a new lease with broad
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Of course, if the owner of a surface estate consents to pooling, then
pooling could be used even if a split estate exists. But given that the owner
of a surface estate is not entitled to revenue from oil and gas production,
such a person has little incentive to consent. Thus, a broad reading of
Crowder could make it difficult to use voluntary pooling involving tracts
where there is a split estate in West Virginia.197 Further, given that West
Virginia’s compulsory pooling statute only applies to certain depths,198
and that these depths do not include the highly-productive Marcellus
formation,199 a broad reading of Crowder could hinder efforts to conduct
operations in an efficient manner in any areas of West Virginia where split
estates are common.
b. Recent Developments—Changes to Colorado’s Pooling Rules
In 2019, Colorado enacted legislation designed to impose stricter
environmental regulations on oil and gas activities and to give landowners
and local communities more power to oppose oil and gas development.200
A portion of that legislation amended Colorado’s pooling statute in several
ways. One of the amendments provides that a pooling order must prohibit
the unit operator from using the surface of any tract owned by any
“nonconsenting owner”—that is, a person who declines to participate in
the cost of drilling and operating the unit wells—without that person’s
permission.201 Often, the owners of tracts that are not under an oil and gas
lease will be nonconsenting owners.

pooling authority? It would seem not. A different issue would arise, though, if, at
the time a split estate is created, an oil and gas lease that authorizes pooling exists,
but the lease terminates. In that situation, would the mineral estate include the
right to pool, so that a mineral estate owner could authorize pooling in any future
leases?
197. The logic of Crowder should not apply to situations involving
compulsory pooling because the case was based on which party—the mineral
estate owner or the surface estate owner—held certain rights. The authority of a
regulator to order pooling would be based on the state’s pooling statutes and
regulations.
198. W. VA. CODE § 22C-9-7 (authorizing pooling for “deep wells”).
199. W. VA. CODE § 22C-9-2 (defining “deep well” as meaning “any well . . .
drilled to a formation below the top of the uppermost member of the ‘Onondaga
Group’”); see also Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 2013 WL 2097397 *1
(N.D. W. Va.) (noting that Marcellus Shale formation above Onondaga formation).
200. The legislation was Senate Bill 19-181.
201. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116(7)(a)(IV).
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E. The Measure of Liability for a Trespasser’s Removal of Minerals
The last of the recent developments in this Article does not deal with
whether a trespass has occurred, but instead deals with the proper measure
of damages. In particular, what is the proper measure of damages when a
“good faith” trespasser extracts minerals from land.
1. Background
Occasionally, a person trespasses onto land and produces minerals
from the land. When this happens, it typically is the result of a mistake.
Sometimes, the trespasser is operating, by mistake, beyond the boundary
of tracts where it has a right to operate. Other times, the trespasser is
operating pursuant to a lease that previously expired, without the
trespasser knowing it had expired or pursuant to a lease granted by
someone who lacked valid title to the mineral rights that the lease purports
to cover.
In any case, the trespasser typically owes compensation to the
landowner (or mineral owner in the event that there is a split estate) for the
unauthorized removal of minerals.202 But what is the proper measure of
damages for the unauthorized removal of minerals? In virtually all states,
the measure of liability depends on whether the trespasser was in “good
faith” or “bad faith,” with a “bad faith” trespasser being subject to greater
liability than a “good faith” trespasser, but jurisdictions have not followed
uniform rules regarding the distinction between “good faith” and “bad
faith” or the extent of liability of a “good faith” trespasser.
a. The Majority Rule
Under the majority rule, the measure of liability for a trespasser’s
removal of minerals depends on whether the trespasser was in “good faith”
or “bad faith.” A good faith trespasser—also sometimes called an
“innocent trespasser”—is liable for the value of the minerals that he
produced, minus the costs that he actually and reasonably incurred in
producing the minerals. In contrast, a “bad faith trespasser”—sometimes
called a “willful trespasser”—is liable for the full value of the minerals he
produced, without a deduction for the expenses he incurred. The United
States Supreme Court described this rule in a case relating to oil and gas
rights, stating:
202. See, e.g., Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 57 (Alaska 1976). Of
course, the trespasser also typically will be liable for the damage, if any, that it
caused to the land during the trespass.
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An agreed premise is found in the rule that one who “willfully” or “in
bad faith” trespasses on the land of another, and removes minerals, is liable
to the owner for their full value computed as of the time the trespasser
converted them to his own use, by sale or otherwise, but that an ‘innocent’
trespasser, who has acted “in good faith,” may deduct from such value the
expenses of extraction.203
This agreed premise has been expressly recognized in the jurisprudence
of numerous states that have expressly recognized this “agreed promise”
when addressing this question in the context of oil and gas activity or
mining. These states include Alaska,204 Arkansas,205 California,206
Colorado,207 Illinois,208 Kansas,209 Kentucky,210 Louisiana,211 Michigan,212
Montana,213 Nevada,214 New Mexico,215 Ohio,216 Oklahoma,217
Pennsylvania,218 Texas,219 Virginia,220 West Virginia,221 and Wyoming.222
The good faith or innocent trespasser is allowed a credit for its
reasonable expenses because the landowner would have had to incur such
expenses if she had produced the minerals herself. Thus, she would be
203. United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 458 (1947).
204. See, e.g., Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 57 (Alaska 1976).
205. Nat’l Lead Co. v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 231 F. Supp. 208, 218
(W.D. Ark. 1964).
206. Whittaker v. Otto, 248 Cal. App.2d 666 (Cal. App. 1967).
207. Kroulik v. Knuppel, 634 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1981).
208. Lambach v. Town of Mason, 53 N.E.2d 601, 607-08 (Ill. 1944); (oil and
gas case).
209. Armstrong v. Bromley, 378 P.3d 1090 (Kan. 2016).
210. Harrod Concrete & Stone Co. v. Crutcher, 458 S.W.3d 290 (Ky. 2015);
(stating this rule in a mining case, but expressly stating that the same rule applies
in oil and gas cases).
211. State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 163 So. 145, 167 (La. 1935).
212. Robinson v. Gordon Oil Co., 253 N.W. 218, 219 (Mich. 1934).
213. Edington v. Creek Oil Co., 690 P.2d 970 (Mont. 1984).
214. Dinwiddie Const. Co. v. Campbell, 406 P.2d 294, 297–98 (Nev. 1965).
215. Alvarado Min. & Mill. V. Warnock, 187 P. 542 (N.M. 1919).
216. Brady v. Stafford, 152 N.E. 188, 191 (Ohio 1926).
217. Edwards v. Lachman, 534 P.2d 670, 677 (Okla. 1974); Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Aladdin Petroleum Corp., 238 P.2d 827 (Okla. 1951).
218. Sabella v. Appalachian Dev. Corp., 103 A.3d 83, 98–99 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2014).
219. Victory Energy Corp. et al. v. OZ Gas Corp., 461 S.W.3d 159, 178 (Tex.
App. 2014).
220. Mullins v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 227 F.2d 881, 885–86 (4th Cir. 1955).
221. Reynolds v. Pardee & Curtin Lumber Co., 310 S.E.2d 870, 876 (W. Va.
1983).
222. Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 253 P. 862, 864 (Wyo. 1927).
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unjustly enriched by an award equal to the full value of the minerals,
without a deduction of the expenses necessary to produce them. Further,
such an award would be a harsh result for the good faith trespasser. On the
other hand, courts state that bad faith or willful trespassers should be liable
for the full value of the minerals, even though this might overcompensate
the landowner, in order to deter such trespasses.
The states that follow the majority rule regarding the extent of a good
faith or bad faith trespasser’s liability do not all follow a uniform rule
regarding what “good faith” and “bad faith” mean in the context of a
trespasser’s production of minerals. Some jurisdictions use a somewhat
literal meaning of “good faith” and “bad faith.” Kentucky provides one
example. In Hughett v. Caldwell County,223 (fluorspar224 mining), a
Kentucky Appellate Court explained:
It has been concisely said in a case of this kind that the difference
between a willful and an innocent trespasser is “the one knows he
is wrong and the other believes he is right.” The specific
delineation is that a willful trespasser is one who knowingly and
willfully encroaches or enters upon the land of another and takes
his mineral without color or claim of right, or one who dishonestly
or in bad faith mines minerals of another and converts them to his
own use, while an innocent trespasser is one who does so under
color of right or in good faith by mistake.225
Another Kentucky case, Harrod Concrete and Stone Co. v. Crutcher,
stated that a trespass that is “inadvertent or ‘the result of an honest mistake’
constitutes an innocent trespass.”226
West Virginia provides another example. In Reynolds v. Pardee &
Curtin Lumber Co.,227 the court stated:
A trespasser who does so intentionally or recklessly with intent to
‘take an unconscientious advantage of his victim” commits a
willful or bad faith trespass
***
223. 230 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. App. 1950) (internal citations omitted).
224. Fluorspar is also known as fluorite. It is a mineral composed of calcium
and fluorine and is represented by the chemical formula CaF2. It has several uses
in the chemical and metallurgical industries.
225. 230 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky. App. 1950).
226. 458 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Ky. 2015).
227. 310 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1983).
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If the trespass be committed, not recklessly, but through
inadvertence or mistake, or in good faith, under an honest belief
that the trespasser was acting within his legal rights, it is an
innocent trespasser.228
Other jurisdictions do not use a literal meaning of “good faith.” In those
jurisdictions, a trespasser’s honest belief that he was not trespassing may
be necessary for that person to be deemed in legal “good faith,” but it is
not necessarily sufficient. In those jurisdictions, a trespasser may be in
“bad faith” even if he believed he had a right to operate where and when
he did, if he was aware that a person who ultimately turns out to be the
true landowner or mineral estate owner was claiming that the trespasser’s
operations would constitute a trespass.
For example, in Louisiana, the distinction between good faith and bad
faith is controlled by Civil Code article 487. Article 487 provides that a
possessor of property “is in good faith when he possesses by virtue of an
act translative of ownership and does not know of any defects in his
ownership. He ceases to be in good faith when these defects are made
known to him or an action is instituted against him by the owner for the
recovery of the thing.”229 Thus, for a trespasser to be in good faith, it is not
sufficient that he believed he had a right to operate—that is, that he did
“not know of any defects in his ownership” or lease rights. Certain events
can end the trespasser’s “good faith” for purposes of trespass liability,
even if the trespasser is still in subjective good faith. For example, if the
true owner files suit to recover possession of the land, that will end the
trespasser’s legal good faith, even if he believes that the suit has no merit
and the landowner has not yet obtained a judgment vindicating her rights.
Texas may provide another example. Some of its jurisprudence
suggests that, if a trespasser entered land when he was aware of a claim or
a lawsuit, the effect of which, would be to deny his exploration rights, he
necessarily was a bad faith trespasser.230 On the other hand, other Texas
jurisprudence suggests that a trespasser’s knowledge of an adverse claim
does not mean that, as a matter of law, the trespasser necessarily was a bad
faith trespasser.231

228. Id. at 876.
229. LA. CIV. CODE art. 487.
230. See, e.g., Whelan v. Killingsworth, 537 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App. 1975);
Houston Prod. Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App. 1933).
231. Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Corp., 562 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. 1977).
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b. The Minority Rule
The minority rule regarding the extent of a good faith trespasser’s
liability provides that the liability depends on whether the plaintiff was in
a position to conduct mining or drilling operations. Under this rule, in the
event of a good faith trespass, a plaintiff who was not in a position to
conduct mining or drilling operations was entitled to damages based on
the market value of a lease royalty for the mineral at issue.
The basis for this rule is the theory that an award of the total value of
the minerals, minus the cost of production, overcompensates the
landowner. The rationale of this theory is that such an award is equivalent
to awarding the profits from a mining or drilling operation, but the owner
who was not capable of mining or drilling could never have earned such
profits. On the other hand, such an owner could grant a lease and receive
a royalty. Thus, an award of a market-rate royalty would make the
landowner whole by compensating her for the money she could have
earned by granting a lease.232
If, on the other hand, a plaintiff was in position to conduct mining or
drilling operations, that plaintiff would have been in a position to conduct
operations and earn a profit. Thus, the loss that plaintiff incurred due to
the trespasser’s tort was the profits from mineral activity. Accordingly, the
minority rule provided that such a plaintiff could recover from a good faith
trespasser the full value of the minerals at the mouth of the mine or well,
minus the reasonable costs that the trespasser incurred in producing the
minerals.
This minority rule apparently used to be more widely followed than it
is now, but most states have abandoned the rule, with many doing so long
ago. But until recently, Kentucky continued to follow the minority rule.

232. Although this rationale apparently was the main rationale for the minority
view, other rationales may have existed. For example, Kentucky followed the
minority rule, apparently based in large part on the above-stated reasoning, but an
additional rationale was revealed by a commentator. That commentator stated that
early Kentucky decisions developing this relatively mild measure of liability for
defendants may have been influenced by the “deplorable state of title in mineral
producing regions and the immense societal value derived from mining.” Harrod
Concrete & Stone Co. v. Crutcher, 458 S.W.3d 290 (Ky. 2015) (discussing Kelly
M. Easton, The Measure of Damages for Mineral Trespass—A Kentucky
Perspective, 4 J. MIN. L. & POL’Y 137 (1988–1989)). Given the poor state of titles,
if the courts had applied a higher measure of liability, it might have deterred
development too much at a time when policymakers wanted to encourage
development.
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2. Recent Development—Harrod Concrete and Stone Co. v. Crutcher
In Harrod Concrete and Stone Co. v. Crutcher, however, the
Kentucky Supreme Court established a new rule that any plaintiff is
entitled to recover from a good faith trespasser the value of the mineral at
the mouth of the mine or well, minus the trespasser’s reasonable costs.233
It no longer matters whether the plaintiff was capable of mining or drilling.
The court noted that sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a
plaintiff was capable of mining or drilling. Further, the “royalty” value of
damages essentially forces a plaintiff into a retroactive lease, while
allowing the defendant to keep any profits from drilling or mining.
Although a good faith trespasser should not be punished, such a trespasser
should not be allowed to make a profit from its trespass. Harrod involved
mining for limestone, but the court stated that its new rule applies to both
mining of solid minerals and the production of fugacious minerals, such
as oil and gas.234
CONCLUSION
The law of trespass continues to evolve in the context of mineral
exploration and production, including both oil and gas activity and mining.
These activities raise unique trespass issues given such factors as the great
depths at which operations take place, the fact that surface estate and
mineral estate owners have different rights in the same land, and that the
public policy of avoiding waste sometimes conflicts with a plaintiff’s
desire to assert trespass claims to vindicate their alleged possessory rights.
Some of these trends reflect movement toward a balancing of actual
interests in unique situations involving subsurface disputes, rather than
resolving trespass claims by applying the same rules as would apply on
the surface. In Baatz, for example, the United States Sixth Circuit applied
the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding from the Chance case. Baatz and
Chance each declined to apply the ad coleum doctrine literally, concluding
that a landowner generally does not have a possessory interest that gives
her the right to exclude others from her land at depths deep beneath the
surface.
Similarly, in Lightning, a mineral estate owner sought to prevent the
surface owner from authorizing the use of the tract for horizontal drilling
operations that were favored by public policy. The mineral estate owner
correctly noted that the drilling would cause an actual loss of minerals
233. Harrod Concrete & Stone Co., 458 S.W.3d at 290.
234. Id. at 295.
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belonging to the mineral estate owner, but the loss would be miniscule.
The court held that, under the circumstances, Texas would not recognize
a trespass claim in favor of the mineral estate owner.
Recent developments relating to pooling have revealed the tension
between the well-established public policies of preventing physical and
economic waste, which are policies that pooling promotes, versus
protecting the rights of surface owners against unwanted mineral
development. The most recent developments have favored surface owners,
but it is not clear if this will be an ongoing trend. The Crowder case from
West Virginia favored surface owners, as did legislation in Colorado, but
the only slightly older Key Operating case from Texas reached a result
opposite that in Crowder, coming down in favor of pooling and the public
policies promoted by pooling.
Recent developments regarding whether the subsurface intrusion of
fracturing fluids constitutes a trespass repeat themes raised in the pooling
disputes. Recent decisions favor landowners’ assertion of possessory
rights below the surface, while only slightly older decisions from another
jurisdiction rejected a trespass claim, concluding that a plaintiff’s alleged
possessory rights were attenuated, and that recognition of the claim would
retard activities favored by public policy.
A final recent development was Kentucky’s recent adoption of the
majority rule regarding the measure of damages when a good faith
trespasser removes minerals from land—namely, that the mineral owner
is entitled to the value of the removed minerals, minus the costs of
production. A large majority of states that have had occasion to address
the issue now follow this rule.
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